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Immigration Enforcement and State Post-
Conviction Adjudications: Towards 
Nuanced Preemption and True Dialogical 
Federalism 
 DANIEL KANSTROOM* 
The relationship between federal immigration enforce-
ment and state criminal, post-conviction law exemplifies 
certain inevitable complexities of preemption and federal-
ism. Because neither perfect uniformity nor complete 
preemption is possible, we must consider two questions: 
First, whether (and, if so, how) state courts adjudicating 
rights should account for legitimate federal immigration law 
goals, such as uniformity and finality?  Second, how should 
federal courts deploy preemption and federalism principles 
when faced with challenges by federal authorities to such 
state court actions? This article offers a framework of “dia-
logical federalism,” seeking to normalize certain tensions 
under a rubric of dialogue, rather than formal hierarchy or 
efficiency. The framework respects state courts’ rights adju-
dication, while also taking account of the history, current 
norms, structure of immigration enforcement, and contem-
porary models of preemption and federalism.  
State enforcement agents and state courts are deeply en-
gaged in immigration-related processes. But they often must 
do so in the context of historically powerful sub-federal sys-
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Thomas F. Carney Distinguished Scholar, and Director 
of International Human Rights Program, Boston College Law School. Thanks to 
Buzzy Baron, George Brown, Kent Greenfield, Kari Hong, Mary Holper, Emily 
Kanstroom, Renee Jones, Diane Ring, and Mark Spiegel who generously brain-
stormed aspects of this article with me (though they may have simply thought we 
were having casual conversations). 
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tems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analy-
sis, etc. The best state court decisions balance autonomy, fi-
delity to state precedent, and protections of rights with 
awareness of federal concerns. There is no precise formula, 
but nuanced state court adjudications should help federal 
courts, when considering preemption challenges to state ac-
tions, to resist formalistic (and unrealistic) field preemption 
or plenary power preemption. The benefits of this approach 
could be substantial. With equal protection as a backstop, it 
could empower the states to define the confines of political 
communities, thereby offering a truly transformative model 
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 There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes coop-
eration under the federal law . . . 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article considers the relationship between federal immigra-
tion enforcement and state criminal, post-conviction law. This rela-
tionship exemplifies certain inevitable complexities of preemption 
and federalism. The article’s main premise is that perfect uniformity 
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or complete preemption would be simplistic, ahistorical, and ulti-
mately impossible. Two questions flow from this: First, whether 
(and, if so, how) state courts adjudicating rights should take account 
of such legitimate federal immigration law goals as uniformity and 
finality? 1 Second, how should federal courts deploy preemption and 
federalism principles when faced with challenges by federal author-
ities to such state court actions? This article offers a framework of 
“dialogical federalism.” This is essentially a variant of “coopera-
tive” or “dialectical” federalism that aims to normalize certain ten-
sions under a rubric of dialogue rather than formal hierarchy or ef-
ficiency.2 The framework takes account of the history, current 
norms, and structure of immigration enforcement, as well as the 
most relevant contemporary models of preemption and federalism.3 
It has long been axiomatic that federal law preempts conflicting 
state laws relating to immigration enforcement, even those that pur-
port to “mirror” federal enforcement goals.4 As the Supreme Court 
put it in 1875, “[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission 
                                                                                                             
 1 These problems are not unique to criminal law. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, 
Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the 
States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 357, 360 (2002) (noting how state marriage 
laws affect immigration law). 
 2 See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: 
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1047 (1977) (describing “a 
model of hierarchical imposition of federally determined values; and a model of 
fragmentation, justifying value choices by the states”); see also Catherine Powell, 
Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human 
Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 249 (2001) (arguing for 
an approach, “premised on dialogue and intergovernmental relations as a way to 
negotiate, rather than avoid, conflict and indeterminacy”). Cf. Philip J. Weiser, 
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663, 668 (2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that [the cooperative 
federalism model] best describes those instances in which a federal statute pro-
vides for state regulation or implementation to achieve federally proscribed policy 
goals.”). 
 3 Or, as Heather Gerken has usefully pluralized, “federalisms.” Heather K. 
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2012) (“It 
would be useful if federalism debates were more attentive to the fact that there are 
many federalisms, not one. . . . It would be useful if scholars were more attentive 
to the fact that the questions federalism raises need not involve an either/or an-
swer. Often they will involve a both/and.”). 
 4 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). 
492 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:489 
 
of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to 
Congress and not to the States.”5 This model has also been applied 
to deportation.6 The model is moderately stable, but—as we shall 
see—there are many exceptions and pesky qualifications. Moreover, 
though the recent cascade of state immigration enforcement laws 
seems to have peaked; its impact on preemption doctrine and, more 
broadly, on “immigration federalism” remains to be fully assessed. 
The complexities of immigration preemption and immigration 
federalism were apparent before—and remain so after—Arizona v. 
United States, in which the Supreme Court invalidated various state 
initiatives, but (provisionally) allowed state law enforcement agents 
to investigate immigration status under certain circumstances.7 
Though the Court saw some aspects of immigration enforcement as 
“a harmonious whole,” the system is better described as “a patch-
work of overlapping and potentially conflicting authority.”8 
This patchwork challenges doctrinal stability and clarity. Histor-
ically, some courts and scholars have tried to meet this challenge by 
                                                                                                             
 5 Id. 
 6 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 727 (1893) (upholding 
federal deportation law that required Chinese noncitizens to produce a “credible 
white witness”). 
 7 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that sec-
tions 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neigh-
borhoods Act (S. B. 1070) were preempted by federal law, but provisionally up-
holding a provision that allowed law enforcement to investigate a person’s immi-
gration status. “This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitu-
tional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect . . .”); 
see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973, 1987 (2011) 
(upholding Arizona law that mandated revocation of business licenses for em-
ployers who hire undocumented workers); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, The 
Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1833, 1840 n.34 (1993) (noting that, though federal supremacy and strong 
preemption are well-accepted, this is neither “natural nor inevitable” as a feature 
of federalism). 
 8 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2502; Monica W. Varsanyi et al., A 
Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration Federalism in the United 
States, 34 L. & POL’Y 138, 138 (2012) (“Our findings suggest that immigration 
federalism, when viewed through the lens of local law enforcement, looks more 
like a patchwork of overlapping and potentially conflicting authority than a sys-
tematic approach to immigration enforcement.”); see also Lina Newton, Policy 
Innovation or Vertical Integration? A View of Immigration Federalism from the 
States, 34 L. & POL’Y 113, 117–18 (2012). 
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differentiating pure immigration law (i.e., the control of the entry 
and residence of noncitizens) from alienage law (which allows states 
to regulate the rights of noncitizens in various ways).9 Such a di-
chotomy is workable for some purposes, as it defends the legitimacy 
of federal oversight of pieces of the patchwork. But it does not help 
us to differentiate legitimate state immigration enforcement (if there 
can be such) from that which should be preempted.10 
Uniformity is a powerful goal and a siren song in this realm. 
Indeed, uniformity has been praised in recent years both by those 
who oppose strenuous state immigration enforcement and by those 
who support it.11 The ACLU amicus brief in Arizona v. United 
States approvingly recites that, “This Court has long recognized the 
special need, expressed in the Constitution, for uniformity and fed-
eral supremacy in the immigration area.”12 Similarly, the amicus 
brief written on behalf of Representative Lamar Smith, et al., argues 
that the Arizona legislation was “a multi-faceted effort to assist fed-
eral authorities in implementing several well-established federal 
policies: removing illegal aliens from the United States and elimi-
nating incentives that cause many such aliens to seek to remain 
here.”13 
This convergence could of course be explained instrumentally: 
Those who oppose such immigration enforcement support federal 
preemption when it seems in their ideological interest to do so.14 
                                                                                                             
 9 See, e.g., Varsanyi et al., supra note 8, at 154 n.2. 
 10 Some argue that “field preemption” renders all such efforts unsustainable. 
See Drew C. Harris, A Supremacy Clause Battle: Chamber of Commerce v. Whit-
ing and the Gradual Shift to State Immigration Enforcement, 32 IMMIGR. & 
NAT’LITY L. REV. 837, 851 (2011). 
 11 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. 
in Support of Respondent at 2, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) 
(No. 11-182). 
 12 See, e.g., id. 
 13 Brief of U.S. Reps. Lamar Smith et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 3–4, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182) 
(emphasis added). 
 14 For a fuller explication of this instrumentalist model, see Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014) (noting that 
partisan federalism “‘involves political actors’ use of state and federal govern-
ments in ways that articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the political 
parties, and the affective individual processes of state and national identification 
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Those who seek stronger enforcement defend state involvement by 
arguing that it merely aims to assist federal authorities.15 However, 
such instrumental motivations explain litigants better than judges.16 
Is there a doctrinally solid and consistent theoretical model that 
could better explain how the various forms of state immigration ac-
tion do/should relate to federal immigration enforcement?17 The full 
answer to this broad question is beyond the scope of this article.18 
However, state post-conviction adjudications that implicate immi-
gration enforcement are a good starting point for such a project. 
They reveal a most salient fact: Federal immigration enforcement 
already (and inevitably) involves state laws and adjudications. The 
hard questions are how best to understand and how to structure this 
                                                                                                             
that accompany this dynamic.”); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1528 (1994); see generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the 
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
215 (2000) (examining how party politics has preserved the states’ voice in na-
tional councils by linking political fortunes of state and federal officials). 
 15 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 14, at 1080–81. It could also be explained 
if one side is clearly wrong, as may well be the case. My point, however, is not 
about correctness, but about the appeal to uniformity by both sides. Supporters of 
enforcement may also, of course, argue for robust federalism. The apotheosis of 
this approach was Justice Scalia’s remarkable concurrence in Arizona v. United 
States, which renders largely irrelevant all Supreme Court immigration law prec-
edents since the Grant Administration. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012) (Scalia, J., concurring). By Supreme Court immigration law precedents 
since the Grant Administration, I mean since Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 
(1875). 
 16 Though preemption theories are well-described in general as “a muddle.” 
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000). 
 17 For an engaging dialogue along similar lines, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram 
& Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dia-
lectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2009); see also Stella Burch Elias, 
The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 703, 748–49 (2013) (“The 
Supreme Court’s recent rulings in Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Com-
merce v. Whiting portend a new era of immigration federalism, defined not by state 
and local efforts to enforce immigration laws and deport immigrants, but rather by 
state and local experimentation with measures intended to foster immigrant inclu-
sion.”). 
 18 This is largely due to the multi-faceted nature of the state/federal relation-
ship and the complexity of preemption and federalism doctrines. 
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relationship.19 Let me be candid about the unavoidable problem of a 
normative baseline: This essay seeks a doctrinal model that com-
ports with a critique of current federal enforcement as disproportion-
ately harsh and violative of basic human rights.20 The model pro-
posed herein thus tends to support preemption in such situations as 
the “force-multipliers” attempted in Arizona, Alabama, etc., while 
counseling federal deference to state adjudications that protect basic 
rights in immigration enforcement settings. The obvious challenge 
is to justify this in a non-instrumentalist way.21 
This article begins with an examination of the basic principles 
governing federal preemption and federalism in immigration law. It 
then considers the history of the relationship between state criminal 
laws and federal deportation together with a more specific analysis 
of the most important recent case to navigate these waters: Padilla 
v. Kentucky.22 It closely examines a question that has spawned much 
                                                                                                             
 19 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Im-
prove the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (“[T]heo-
ries of preemption need to accept the truisms that the federal and state govern-
ments have largely overlapping jurisdictions, that each level of government is 
acutely aware of what the other is doing, and that each level regulates with an eye 
to how such regulation will affect the other.”). 
 20 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 19 (2007); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: 
DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 63 (2012). For a recent 
report about the harshness of the enforcement system, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, A PRICE TOO HIGH: US FAMILIES TORN APART BY DEPORTATIONS FOR 
DRUG OFFENSES 79 (2015), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re-
ports/us0615_ForUpload_0.pdf. 
 21 For a catalogue of federalism(s), see Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms 
and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and 
Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV 
363, 371 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (“administrative feder-
alism, cooperative federalism, competitive federalism, creative federalism, cul-
tural federalism, dialectical federalism, dialogical federalism, dual federalism, fis-
cal federalism, intrastatutory federalism, noncategorical federalism, polyphonic 
federalism, territorial federalism, and the like. . .[any of which Resnik has been 
hesitant to assume] provides a stable and general account.”); Heather K. Gerken, 
Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1914 
n.169 (2014). 
 22 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (a noncitizen criminal defendant has a constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel about potential deportation consequences). 
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recent federal and state litigation: whether Padilla’s norms are “ret-
roactive.”23 The Supreme Court ruled against retroactivity in 
Chaidez v. United States.24 This ruling, however, does not bind state 
courts due to “considerations of comity.”25 States may “give broader 
effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required.”26 But 
significant state variation seems uniquely problematic where a ma-
jor federal enforcement system is predicated on state criminal adju-
dications. It is surely an oddity worth pondering that a noncitizen 
who pled guilty to a drug offense in Massachusetts in 2009 may now 
successfully contest deportation through state court post-trial mo-
tions, while a noncitizen who took an identical plea deal in New 
Hampshire faces mandatory deportation and life-time banishment 
from the United States.27 
The article’s proposed framework neither fully embraces nor 
completely condemns such oddities. Rather it seeks to explain why 
they exist and to explore possible hidden benefits to the apparent 
jurisprudential cacophony.  
The essential conclusion is that state enforcement agents and 
state courts are deeply engaged in immigration-related processes. 
This engagement implicates normatively powerful sub-federal sys-
tems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analysis, etc. 
The best state court decisions balance autonomy, fidelity to state 
precedent, and protections of rights with some awareness of federal 
                                                                                                             
 23 I put this word in quotation marks intentionally, as some courts and com-
mentators have seen retroactivity as an inapposite framework for the question of 
whether Padilla’s norm were in effect prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the case itself. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or 
“Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give 
Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Post-
conviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 8–27 (2009). 
 24 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (holding that Padilla v. Kentucky crafted a 
“new rule”). 
 25 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279–80 (2008) (“[C]onsidera-
tions of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to 
a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague.”). 
 26 Danforth, 552 U.S. at 266. 
 27 Chang, supra note 1, at 360 (“[A]liens that commit the same act in different 
states may face different immigration consequences because the states in which 
they commit the crime may convict them under laws that define the crime differ-
ently.”). 
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concerns. There can be no precise formula. When federal courts con-
sider preemption challenges, such sophisticated, nuanced state court 
adjudications should help them to resist formalistic (and unrealistic) 
field preemption or plenary power preemption. The benefits of this 
dialogue could be substantial, as state courts could help to develop 
transformative, rights-protective models of immigration federalism. 
I.  PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
We will not accept an interpretation of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act that permits, let alone requires, speculation 
by federal agencies about the secret motives of state judges 
and prosecutors. 
Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
The nuances of preemption and “immigration federalism” have 
spawned a robust recent literature.28 Some have argued in favor of 
                                                                                                             
 28 See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as La-
boratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1673 (critiquing 
“forced federalism,” which “limits states to a narrow set of enforcement decisions 
based on federally defined norms.”); Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 
101 CAL. L. Rev. 553, 553 (2013) (“This Article traces out the implications of a 
world where criminal courts (especially at the state level) operate as de facto im-
migration courts.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, 
and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (defin-
ing immigration federalism as “states and localities play[ing a role] in making and 
implementing law and policy relating to immigration and immigrants[]”); David 
Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 157, 157 (2012) (examining how the intertwining of criminal law and 
immigration law tends “to treat legal rules and legal procedures as interchangea-
ble tools”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Im-
migrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376–77 (2006) 
(exploring the causes and theoretical underpinnings of the criminalization of im-
migration law). 
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such state immigration enforcement measures as useful “force mul-
tipliers.”29 Others have opposed such measures—both on equal-
ity/anti-discrimination and federalism grounds—with equal vigor.30 
Some have questioned the conventional wisdom that states are more 
hostile to immigration than federal authorities.31 Indeed, contrary to 
the general opposition by immigrant-rights advocates to most state 
enforcement of immigration laws, some have argued that there could 
be progressive benefits for immigrants from immigration-related 
state actions.32 
                                                                                                             
 29 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The In-
herent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 
179, 181 (2005) (arguing in favor of immigration-based arrests by state and local 
officials); Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local 
Law Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
323, 327, 329 (2005) (arguing in favor of state and local enforcement of federal 
immigration law). 
 30 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State 
Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 252–61, 
291–95 (2011) (arguing that the “the mirror-image theory fails to identify a legit-
imate source of state authority to legislate on immigration matters”); Huyen 
Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the 
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 1373, 1377, 1401 (2006) (fo-
cusing on possible “racial profiling or other abuses of authority”); Michael J. 
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal 
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 515–18 (2001) (describing 
discriminatory state laws and anticipating more such laws in the future); Michael 
J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1084, 1088–95 (2004) (arguing that state and local police have no “in-
herent authority” to enforce federal immigration laws and that they have been 
preempted by federal law). 
 31 See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 57, 59–60, 65–66 (2007). 
 32 See Spiro, supra note 28, at 1636 (describing possible benefit of immigra-
tion federalism’s “steam valve” function); see also Victor C. Romero, Devolution 
and Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377, 384–85 (2002) (arguing 
that “devolution” could benefit same-sex partners if federal immigration law rec-
ognized same-sex unions sanctioned by states); Peter L. Markowitz, Undocu-
mented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 875 
(2015) (seeking to fill the void in “modern scholarship that explores the power of 
states to advance inclusive constructions of state citizenship”). 
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Some scholars have highlighted the inevitability of federal/state 
overlaps due to the nature of the immigration enforcement system.33 
Peter Schuck, for example, notes that the “federalist default” ar-
rangement involves extensive reliance “on state and local involve-
ment, including in the enforcement of federally-promulgated 
rules.”34 Clare Huntington explains that “authority over pure immi-
gration law is shared among levels of government.”35 This, she sug-
gests, makes “state and local involvement in immigration [] far less 
suspect,” and makes possible “more nuanced debate.”36 Similarly, 
Cristina Rodríguez has called for “a modus vivendi regarding immi-
gration regulation by all levels of government.”37 Stella Burch Elias 
has broadly asserted that we now live in an era of “a new direction 
for ‘immigration federalism’” in which there is “ample opportunity 
for different varieties of state and local engagement with noncitizen 
residents.”38 This evokes a theory of federalism that recognizes, as 
                                                                                                             
 33 See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Fed-
eralism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2008) (arguing strongly against “struc-
tural preemption,” stating, “[o]nce it is clear that the Constitution allows a role for 
subnational polities in immigration, the conventional and contested values of fed-
eralism become operable.”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local 
in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 571–72, 609–10, 615–17 
(2008) (arguing that all levels of government operate as an integrated system to 
manage immigration assimilation); Schuck, supra note 31, at 64, 67–84 (arguing 
against federal exclusivity in employment-based admissions, criminal justice, and 
employer sanctions); see also Ming H. Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Fed-
eralism: Toward A Doctrinal Framework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1087, 1087–88 
(2014) (explaining that “cooperative federalism in immigration is legally permis-
sible and normatively desirable in some instances.”); Spiro, supra note 28, at 1627 
(discussing “‘steam-valve’ virtues of federalism” in the immigration context); Pe-
ter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (1994) (examining federal exclusivity through the lens of 
international law and suggesting that “[a]s a practical matter, immigration is now 
largely a state-level concern.”). 
 34 Schuck, supra note 30, at 65–66 (noting that “[i]ndeed, it is hard to think 
of a national program (other than Social Security) that is run entirely by the federal 
government without any state involvement”). 
 35 Huntington, supra note 33, at 791–92. 
 36 Id. Huntington defines “pure” immigration law as “the rules governing the 
admission and removal of non-citizens.” Id. at 791. 
 37 Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 570. 
 38 Burch Elias, supra note 17, at 705 (“The Arizona Court’s reinvigoration of 
the doctrine of broad federal power in the immigration arena does not foreclose all 
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Judith Resnik posits, that “the domains of authority are not fixed but 
renegotiated as conflicts emerge about the import of rights and the 
content of jurisdictional allocations.”39 
Such dynamic approaches are especially useful in this arena. 
States have long been deeply engaged in various forms of immigra-
tion regulation and enforcement, though the modalities are not al-
ways as clear as contemporary anti-immigrant legislation.40 Immi-
gration enforcement through state criminal justice systems is thus a 
very well-worn path.41 Still, Cristina Rodríguez argues that a com-
                                                                                                             
state action pertaining to immigrants and immigration . . . . [it] provides ample 
opportunity for different varieties of state and local engagement with noncitizen 
residents—some of which will be novel and some of which will involve the further 
development or redirection of preexisting laws and policies.”); see also, Peter L. 
Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. 869, 875 (2015) (seeking to fill the void in “modern scholarship that ex-
plores the power of states to advance inclusive constructions of state citizenship”); 
see also Markowitz, supra note 32; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ra-
makrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2074, 
2081 (2013) (highlighting that “state and local immigration laws are part of an 
orchestrated legislative cascade, mostly unrelated to underlying policy concerns,” 
and “the inherent structure of our federalist system creates a dynamic feedback 
loop whereby subfederal immigration policies hinder comprehensive federal re-
form efforts”).  
 39 Resnik, supra note 21, at 363. 
 40 See Jason Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C.D.L. REV. 355, 365 
(2012). 
 41 See generally id. (noting that “the federal government primarily depends 
on states and their criminal justice systems to determine in the first instance 
whether lawfully present immigrants are criminals and therefore deportable under 
federal law.”). Other such pathways—beyond the scope of this essay—include 
marriage, divorce, child custody, adoption, and SIJ adjudications in state courts. 
But see Lee, supra note 28, at 558 (noting that “Congress created an enforcement 
system that attaches immigration consequences to criminal convictions without 
formally empowering any party within the criminal courts to make immigration-
related decisions” and suggesting ways to “accommodate this reality”); Peter H. 
Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises 
of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 458–63 (1999) (proposing a 
“federalist solution” to the problem of “removing criminal aliens”). For a contrary 
view, see HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., BLURRING THE 
LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION 
LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002-2004, 
29 (2005); see also Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief 
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prehensive immigration system must maintain primary federal con-
trol over removal standards as an integral organizational function 
without which “the system would be chaotic.”42 But, from the earli-
est crime-based United States federal exclusion and deportation stat-
utes to the present, state, not federal, convictions have undergirded 
the vast majority of crime-based federal immigration enforcement 
actions, especially “post-entry social control” deportations.43 Put 
simply, since the beginning of the modern deportation regime in the 
early twentieth century, vastly more people have been deported for 
violating state (and even local) criminal laws than for violating fed-
eral criminal law.44 Thus, in many respects this “chaotic” model has 
long been the norm.45 Indeed, as a central feature of immigration 
enforcement, it may not be chaotic at all, simply dynamic or multi-
faceted (or dialectical or dialogical).46 
Federalism, as Judith Resnik writes, “offers an analytic and a 
history of practices demonstrating the capacity to sustain toleration 
within polities of plural legal norms.”47 However, there is no area of 
domestic law where federalism would seem so weak—and where 
preemption is more powerfully implemented—than immigration en-
forcement. This is our basic dilemma. 
                                                                                                             
And The Lost Cause Of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 668 (2008) (cri-
tiquing the distinction between post-conviction relief that is effective for elimi-
nating grounds for deportation and relief that is not effective). 
 42 Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 633. 
 43 See Lee supra note 28, at 571–77; see generally KANSTROOM, 
DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 20 (dis-
cussing how the deportation system is one of “post-entry social control”); see also 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 
35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (1994) (noting the overlap between “alienage” law 
and immigration law in practice). 
 44 See Lee supra note 28, at 576–77. 
 45 See id. at 578–79 (noting that “local prosecutors can manipulate a nonciti-
zen’s removability by adjusting the charges supporting a conviction—by plea bar-
gaining ‘creatively’ with the noncitizen’s lawyer.”); see also Rodríguez, supra 
note 33, at 633 (describing as “chaotic” an immigration system in which the fed-
eral government does not maintain primary control over removal standards). 
 46 See infra Part II; see also Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 633 (describing as 
“chaotic” an immigration system in which the federal government does not main-
tain primary control over removal standards). 
 47 Resnik, supra note 21, at 364. 
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Federal preemption doctrine, in general, stems from the Suprem-
acy Clause,48 and the “fundamental principle of the Constitu-
tion . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state law.”49 In the 
immigration context, this has long been buttressed by notions of 
“plenary” federal power, resulting in rather binary and heavy-
handed models.50 Indeed, more than a half century ago, the Supreme 
Court noted that exclusive federal immigration power, “has become 
about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of 
our body politic as any aspect of our government.”51 As the Court 
reiterated in 2012, a decision on removability is especially sensitive 
in that “[d]ecisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must 
be made with one voice.”52 This model counsels virtually inevitable 
preemption and tends to trump federalism concerns.53 It has poten-
tial virtues of predictability, clarity, and uniformity. However, as 
Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff noted long ago, such paradigms 
(in which a predominant voice is sought) imply that “conflict and 
indeterminacy are dysfunctional.”54 This—to reiterate—is not the 
only way to view federalism in general. Nor is it the best way to 
view immigration federalism.55 
                                                                                                             
 48 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 49 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
 50 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 
601–03 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court improperly used plenary power 
reasoning in Arizona v. United States). 
 51 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
 52 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012). It is not obvi-
ous, for example, that a Massachusetts vacation of a guilty plea really impacts 
foreign relations. 
 53 See id.; see also Peter J. Spiro, Rebuttal, State Action on Immigration (Bad 
and Good) After Arizona v. United States, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 106 
(2012) (“By situating immigration policy within the federal government’s broad 
power over foreign affairs, the Court reversed its typical preemption analysis, 
which, as part of a broader federalism agenda, has been increasingly protective of 
state action.”). 
 54 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1047. 
 55 See Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 
812 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federal-
ism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2143 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a The-
ory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 249 (2005). 
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As lower courts previously held, and as the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Arizona v. United States, federal immigration law is “ex-
tensive and complex.”56 As the Court noted, “the pervasiveness of 
federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration 
policy to the States.”57 Of course, state laws relating to immigration 
enforcement are routinely preempted if they conflict with federal 
law.58 And “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case.”59 In the realm of criminal deportations, 
however, the two spheres of state and federal law simply have not 
been—and cannot realistically be—hermetically sealed from one 
another.60 Thus, the “purpose” of Congress is contradictory: to 
achieve federal uniformity but also to incorporate and to rely upon 
state laws, adjudications, and norms. 
It is thus unsurprising that, in upholding one of Arizona’s initia-
tives, the Court noted that “[c]onsultation between federal and state 
officials is an important feature of the immigration system.”61 The 
recognition of such consultation legitimates dialogue between state 
courts and federal authorities. As an example, the Court imagined 
that “a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be 
unable to produce identification.”62 Arizona’s Section 2(B) instructs 
state officers to make a “‘reasonable’ attempt to verify his immigra-
tion status with ICE.”63 However, the Court, signaling some defer-
ence, noted that “[t]he state courts may conclude that, unless the 
person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may 
                                                                                                             
 56 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 57 Id. at 2500. 
 58 Particularly where the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 
Id. at 2501 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This has long been recog-
nized as “a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute 
as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Id. (citing Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 373 (2000)). 
 59 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 60 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510–11 (holding that §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona’s 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S. B. 1070) were 
preempted by federal law, but upholding a provision that allowed law enforce-
ment to investigate a person’s immigration status). 
 61 Id. at 2496. 
 62 Id. at 2509. 
 63 Id. 
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be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong 
the stop for the immigration  inquiry.”64 Indeed, the concluding par-
agraph of the Court’s analysis of Section 2(B) explicitly awaits a 
“definitive interpretation from the state courts” with what amounts 
to a hint that state courts should try to avoid a construction that “cre-
ates a conflict with federal law.”65 Thus, the state courts must (or at 
least should) take federal law into account when ruling on the state 
law’s scope. Conversely, federal courts should pay greater attention 
to—and be less inclined to broadly preempt—thoughtful rights-
based rulings by state courts even if they may impede federal uni-
formity. 
Clearly, this is a model of dialogue, not dualism. Robert 
Schapiro has suggested that federalist dualism should be replaced 
by “polyphonic federalism,” which “seeks to harness the interaction 
of state and national power to advance the goals associated with fed-
eralism.”66 This is clearly applicable to immigration law enforce-
ment.67 As Cover and Aleinikoff noted, once we reject both a “hier-
archical imposition of federally determined values” and a “model of 
fragmentation, justifying value choices by the states,” we can rec-
ognize that “conflict and indeterminacy” are not necessarily dys-
functional.68 Indeed, they may be productive. Values may evolve 
into rights as lawyers fight about their implications in various set-
tings. Conflicts will arise, of course, as values are interpreted differ-
ently by the two court systems. But, if federal courts can avoid im-
posing a solution based on crude and blunt preemption doctrines, 
then “an open-ended dialogue can ensue.”69 In that way, “[t]he ‘di-
alectical [or dialogical] federalism’ that emerges becomes the driv-
                                                                                                             
 64 Id. (emphasis added). 
 65 Id. at 2510. 
 66 Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, supra note 55, at 
244. 
 67 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929, 935 (1997) (striking down 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on the ground that Congress cannot 
“commandeer” state executive officials to carry out a federal mandate); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot 
“commandeer” state lawmakers by requiring them to pass legislation dictated by 
Congress). 
 68 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1047. 
 69 Id. at 1048. 
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ing force for the” more sophisticated and more legitimate “articula-
tion of rights” that straddle the intertwined state criminal and federal 
immigration systems.70 
We should not ignore the difficulties of such dialogues. Any nu-
anced or subtle model of immigration federalism is hindered by the 
contentious state of contemporary debate. The stakes in boundary 
state/federal conflicts over immigration policies are high; the legal 
and policy debates are fierce. Litigation between Arizona and the 
United States over immigration enforcement was described by one 
prominent supporter of state power as “a battle of epic propor-
tions . . . about a state’s right to enforce the laws of this land and 
protect its citizens from those who break our laws.”71 On the other 
side, a leading immigrant rights advocate saw the Arizona lawsuit 
as a bulwark against mob rule.72 The depth of conflict may be due 
in part to “partisan federalism,” per Jessica Bulman-Pozen, in which 
“federalism provides the institutional terrain for disputes that are 
substantive in nature.”73 It may also be due to the influence of “re-
strictionist issue entrepreneurs” who target certain states and locali-
ties for political reasons, rather than due to real burdens created by 
alleged federal under-enforcement.74 The Supreme Court, as noted, 
                                                                                                             
 70 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1048; see also ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 111–98, 240 (1962) (describing “passive virtues” that facilitate the con-
versation between courts and political actors). 
 71 Marc Lacey, Appeals Court Rules Against Arizona Law, N.Y. TIMES (April 
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/us/12arizona.html?_r=0 (“‘This 
battle is a battle of epic proportions,’ Mr. Pearce said in a statement suggesting he 
was not surprised by the ruling. ‘It is about a state’s right to enforce the laws of 
this land and protect its citizens from those who break our laws.’”). 
 72 Id. (“‘One of the reasons we have a judiciary is so that mobs don’t rule, so 
that when the Legislature oversteps its bounds there is someone to stop them,’ 
said Omar Jadwat of the A.C.L.U. Immigrants’ Rights Project.”). 
 73 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 14, at 1080 (noting that partisan federalism “in-
volves political actors’ use of state and federal governments in ways that articu-
late, stage, and amplify competition between the political parties, and the affective 
individual processes of state and national identification that accompany this dy-
namic.”). 
 74 See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Im-
portance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 
1436–46 (2012) (showing relationship between local partisanship and restrictive 
immigration laws). 
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ultimately recognized the inevitability of some state/federal over-
laps.75 Still, we are left with the muddle that some state legislation 
and some state adjudication relating to immigration enforcement 
may stand, though the federal government may expressly preempt 
any such efforts. Put another way, the complexity of immigration 
enforcement seems to demand federal acquiescence to certain state 
actions, in light not only of practicality and legitimate state interests, 
but also of federalism. But a credible framework has remained elu-
sive.76 
To be sure, tension between state variability and autonomy and 
federal goals of uniformity is not new in this realm. Federal legisla-
tion, agency rules, and agency adjudication have episodically aimed 
to override state variation, but never with complete success. In 1959, 
for example, the Attorney General ruled that state expungements of 
narcotics offenses would have no effect on immigration proceed-
ings.77 In 1990, Congress eliminated the Judicial Recommendation 
Against Deportation (JRAD) that had empowered state court judges 
to prevent the use of state convictions for deportation.78 Most fun-
damentally, in 1996, Congress sought to standardize the federal def-
inition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes.79 Still, peculiar-
ities remain.80 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), for exam-
ple, has held that when a state court vacates a conviction for reasons 
                                                                                                             
 75 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 76 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973. Kerry Abrams has referred to the Arizona decision as “a 
doctrinally empty reaffirmation of federal power.” Abrams, supra note 50, at 602. 
 77 A—F—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 445 (B.I.A. 1959). 
 78 See infra Section II. A. 
 79 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 628 (1996) (providing a statutory 
definition for the term “conviction” for immigration purposes). 
 80 See, e.g., a series of cases reviewing the effects of state rehabilitative stat-
utes. Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2005); Renteria-
Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 812–14 (5th Cir. 2002); Murillo-Espinoza v. 
I.N.S., 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001); Herrera-Inirio v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 299, 
305 (1st Cir. 2000); Moosa v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1999). Cf. Song, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 173, 174 (B.I.A. 2001) (terminating removal proceedings where 
defendant’s criminal sentence was reduced and the crime for which he was con-
victed no longer fell within the meaning of an aggravated felony); see also Martin, 
18 I. & N. Dec. 226, 227 (B.I.A. 1982) (finding a defendant’s initial sentence void 
and of no effect). 
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“solely related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration 
hardships,” the conviction may still justify deportation.81 But the 
BIA will defer to a state court’s decision to vacate due to a proce-
dural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings.82 
Strangely, the BIA will also defer to state courts’ resentencing of a 
non-citizen from a sentence of one year to three hundred and sixty 
days in order to avoid deportation consequences.83 This essay sug-
gests that these are not merely anomalous phenomena. Rather, they 
reflect the inevitably dialectical nature of federal immigration en-
forcement based on state criminal proceedings where basic rights are 
adjudicated. 
This dialectic has survived federal courts’ generally dismissive 
approach to challenges to federal overrides of state post-conviction 
remedies.84 The definition of “conviction” for immigration purposes 
was, for a time, accepted as “a fluid one.”85 However, federal immi-
gration agencies worried that “most states had adopted one or more 
                                                                                                             
 81 Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Pickering, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003)). Cf. Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878, 881 
(B.I.A. 2006) (A “conviction was vacated by the trial court pursuant to section 
2943.031 of the Ohio Revised Code because of a defect in the underlying criminal 
proceedings, i.e., the failure of the court to advise him of the possible immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea.” The conviction was no longer valid for immi-
gration purposes.); Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378, 1380 (B.I.A. 2000) (A 
conviction that has been vacated pursuant to Article 440 of New York Criminal 
Procedure Law does not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.). Also, 
a pardon will not remove the immigration consequences of a conviction for a con-
trolled substance offense. Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1250–
51 (9th Cir. 2008); Cade, supra note 40, at 375. 
 82 See Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 879. 
 83 See Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 174; see also Martin, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 227. 
 84 Such challenges are often made under the Full Faith and Credit Act, and 
under the Fifth or Tenth Amendments. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Ep-
stein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (B.I.A. 1996) (Under the FFCA, a federal court generally 
must give a state court judgment “the same effect that it would have in the courts 
of the State in which it was rendered.”). The FFCA provides that “records and 
judicial proceedings of any court of any such State . . . shall be proved or admitted 
in other courts within the United States . . . . [and] shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United States” as in the courts of that State. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
 85 Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 514–15 (B.I.A. 1999) (noting that 
“[i]n the absence of a statutory definition, this Board, with direction from the Su-
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methods of mitigating the consequences of a conviction . . .”86 Con-
gress said the BIA in 1999 did not intend “that there be different 
immigration consequences accorded to criminals fortunate enough 
to violate the law” in states where certain procedures happened to 
be available.87 A typical refrain was offered by the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals: 
[N]o provision in the I & N Act gives controlling ef-
fect to state law or requires the INS to do an about-
face if a state, pursuant to a diversionary disposition 
scheme, retroactively erases a conviction.88 
                                                                                                             
preme Court and the Attorney General, struggled for more than 50 years to rec-
oncile its definition with the increasing numbers of state statutes providing ame-
liorative procedures affecting the ‘finality’ of a conviction under state law.”) (cit-
ing Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955); Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 548 
(B.I.A. 1988); G—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1960); A—F—, 8 I. & N. 
Dec. 429, 436 (B.I.A. 1959); L—R—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 269, 270 (B.I.A. 1959);  
O—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 539, (B.I.A. 1957); F—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 343, 348 (B.I.A. 
1942)). 
 86 Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 515 (citing Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 
550 (B.I.A. 1988)). The Board of Immigration Appeals repeatedly reiterated its 
(aspirational) understanding of “a long-standing rule that [the determination of] 
whether a conviction exists for purposes of a federal statute is a question of federal 
law and should not depend on the vagaries of state law.” Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
at 551 n.6. Indeed, the Board went so far as to conclude that “the language of the 
statutory definition and its legislative history provide clear direction that this 
Board and the federal courts are not to look to the various state rehabilitative stat-
utes to determine whether a conviction exists for immigration purposes.” Roldan-
Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 521. 
 87 Murillo-Espinoza v. I.N.S., 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) (i.e., “in a 
state where rehabilitation is achieved through the expungement of records . . . ra-
ther than in a state where the procedure achieves the same objective simply 
through deferral of judgment.”) 
 88 Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 2000) (“To the exact 
contrary, state rehabilitative programs that have the effect of vacating a conviction 
other than on the merits or on a basis tied to the violation of a statutory or consti-
tutional right in the underlying criminal case have no bearing in determining 
whether an alien is to be considered ‘convicted’ under section 1101(a)(48)(A).”) 
(citing United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1999); Roldan-San-
toyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 521; Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 
119 (1983); United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778, 782 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
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Similarly, the Second Circuit found the BIA’s tendency to ignore 
state post-conviction remedies to be “reasonable.”89 As the Second 
Circuit reasoned in the context of the use of a state “youthful of-
fender” adjudication as a prior conviction in sentencing: 
[T]he “principles of federalism and comity embodied 
in the full faith and credit statute,” . . . are not endan-
gered when a sentencing court, not questioning the 
propriety of the state’s determination in any way, in-
terprets how to apply New York’s youthful offender 
adjudications to a Guidelines analysis.90 
The basic proposition is that “the federal sentencing court is nei-
ther refusing to recognize nor re-litigating the validity of [the de-
fendant’s] New York state judgment of conviction or his youthful 
offender sentence.”91 Rather, it is merely “acting upon the fact of 
[the defendant’s] prior conviction.”92 
In this model of immigration law, “from a practical perspective” 
state convictions are seen as merely “a useful way for the federal 
government to identify individuals who, because of their criminal 
history, may be appropriate for removal.”93 This sort of “cooperative 
federalism” raises at least two distinct problems. First, state pro-
cesses, even those based on state constitutional conceptions of jus-
tice and fairness, are rendered irrelevant even though Congress has 
expressly used state convictions as the prerequisite to many types of 
                                                                                                             
 89 Because it was “entirely consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the 
1996 amendments to broaden the definition of conviction.” Saleh v. Gonzales, 
495 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2007) (the definition of conviction focuses on “the orig-
inal attachment of guilt (which only a vacatur based on some procedural or sub-
stantive defect would call into question) and imposes uniformity on the enforce-
ment of immigration laws.”); see also Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 
(6th Cir. 2006); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006); Pinho 
v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2005); Ramos v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 800, 
805–06 (7th Cir. 2005); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128–9 (10th 
Cir. 2005); Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1268–71 (11th 
Cir. 2004); Murillo-Espinoza, 261 F.3d at 774. 
 90 United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Saleh, 495 F.3d at 24. 
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deportation.94 Second, it depends (to avoid double jeopardy and 
other constitutional problems) on the doctrine that deportation is 
merely a civil “collateral” consequence of state criminal convic-
tions. But this doctrine has been challenged by Padilla v. Kentucky, 
which held that a noncitizen criminal defendant has a constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings not 
only as to the defense of the criminal case, but also as to advice about 
potential deportation consequences.95 
The historically blended system of immigration enforcement 
thus embodies inevitable deep tensions.96 As Peter Schuck has re-
counted, some federalist arrangements are based on the sovereignty 
                                                                                                             
 94 It is not however, entirely unique to immigration law. The Supreme Court 
once held that, for federal systems such as gun control, state convictions “provide 
a convenient, although somewhat inexact, way of identifying ‘especially risky 
people’”[sic] and therefore “[t]here is no inconsistency in the refusal of Congress 
to be bound by post-conviction state actions . . . that vary widely from State to 
State and that provide less than positive assurance that the person in question no 
longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness.” Dickerson v. New Banner 
Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 120 (1983) (Firearms disabilities imposed by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922 (2012) applied with respect to a person who pleaded guilty to a state offense 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, when the record of the pro-
ceeding subsequently was expunged under state procedure following a success-
fully served term of probation.). But see the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act 
(FOPA), 100 Stat. 449 (1986), in which Congress amended § 921(a)(20) in re-
sponse to Dickerson. The amended provision excludes: “Any conviction which 
has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has 
had civil rights restored . . . unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of 
civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or 
receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 
28 (2007). 
 95 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369–74 (2010); see Daniel Kanstroom, 
The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Con-
struction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1468 
(2011); Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Depor-
tation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress? 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305, 306 
(2011); see also César Cuauhtemoc García Hernandez, Criminal Defense After 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 479–87 (2012). 
 96 See, e.g., Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA), 100 Stat. 449 (1986) 
(providing that, for purposes of the statute, a “conviction” is defined under the 
law of the jurisdiction where the proceedings were held). 
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of the states.97 But many powers exercised by the states today involve 
“a bewilderingly complex system of federal-state relationships in 
which the states participate in programs enacted and largely funded 
by Washington.”98 The relationship between state criminal law—as 
informed by state constitutional adjudications—and federal immi-
gration law, has aspects of both of these forms of federalism. Where 
federal enforcement depends upon state enforcement through the 
states’ police powers, the old dictum becomes especially salient that 
“courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ 
are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress.’”99 Substantively, states are of course largely free to 
craft whatever criminal/constitutional norms they choose. However, 
there are deep overlaps between state criminal law and federal immi-
gration law. State adjudicative autonomy is thus potentially in con-
flict with the fact that states operate under, and are obliged to respect, 
certain federal immigration policies and supervision.100 
It is thus clear that there has been a long and complex historical 
relationship among state post-conviction mechanisms, state constitu-
tional norms, and federal immigration law.101 Indeed, though some-
times seen as the quintessential example of an arena in which federal 
power is at its zenith, immigration enforcement well-illustrates 
                                                                                                             
 97 Schuck, supra note 31, at 66. (“That is, state authority inheres in the con-
stitutional settlement among the states and the people, whereby only limited pow-
ers . . . were delegated to the national government while all other powers were 
reserved to the states and the people.”) 
 98 Id.; see also Chin & Miller, supra note 30, at 255 (“Cooperative enforce-
ment is a familiar idea throughout our federal system and a pervasive concept in 
American criminal justice.”). 
 99 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (citing Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 
(2009)). 
 100 Schuck, supra note 31, at 65; see also Schuck & Williams, supra note 41, 
at 420–421 (citing Pressman and Wildavsky’s study on policy implementation in 
support of the proposition that the current removal system does not make sense). 
In the end, however, as Heather Gerken has noted, “[b]oth devolution and central-
ization are means to an end. They are, in fact, means to the same end: a well-
functioning democracy.” Gerken, supra note 21, at 1891. 
 101 See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE 
GUIDE 1 (2006). 
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Schapiro’s polyphonic conception, in which “it is the dynamic inter-
action among states and the national government that forms the true 
sound of federalism.”102 This state/federal relationship may be both 
confrontational and cooperative, as polyphony, like dialogue, ac-
cepts both dissonance and harmony.103 Let us now consider specif-
ics. 
II.  THE INEVITABLE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN DEPORTATION 
PROCEEDINGS: FROM THE JRAD TO PADILLA AND ITS PROGENY 
We have not expressly stated that art. 12 [of the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights] demands that defense counsel 
provide defendants with accurate advice concerning the de-
portation consequences of a guilty plea or conviction at trial. 
That such a right exists, however, is implicit . . . . 
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 771 (Mass. 2013). 
 
When the modern post entry social control deportation system 
was first crafted in the early twentieth century, federal enforcement 
was mediated by a variety of state measures, including the availabil-
ity of gubernatorial pardons, expungements, rehabilitative measures 
and, most subtly, state adjudicative norms.104 Goals of federal uni-
formity have, however, long been powerful in this realm. Consider, 
                                                                                                             
 102 Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, supra note 55, at 
249. 
 103 See id. 
 104 Expungement means either a statute that permits a deferred adjudication of 
a conviction (in which case a judgment is never entered), or a court vacation or 
setting aside of a judgment of conviction pursuant to a rehabilitative statute. As 
the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[under a] ‘vacatur’ or ‘set-aside’ [statute], a for-
mal judgment of conviction is entered after a finding of guilt, but then is erased 
after the defendant has served a period of probation or imprisonment and his con-
viction is ordered dismissed by the judge . . . . [Under a] ‘deferred adjudication’ 
[statute], no formal judgment of conviction or guilt is ever entered. Instead, after 
the defendant pleads or is found guilty, entry of conviction is deferred, and then 
during or after a period of good behavior, the charges are dismissed and the judge 
orders the defendant discharged.” Lujan-Armendariz v. I.N.S., 222 F.3d 728, 734, 
n.11 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705, 708 (A.G. 2005); 
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for example, the Attorney General’s 1960 opinion that rendered 
state expungements inapplicable to narcotics cases.105 As the Attor-
ney General argued, “to follow the Board’s view [allowing expunge-
ments to defeat deportation] would make the deportability of the al-
ien depend upon the vagaries of state law.”106 The powerful goals of 
federal uniformity were summarized in his conclusion: 
It is hardly to be supposed that Congress intended, in 
providing for the deportation of aliens convicted of 
narcotic violations, to extend preferential treatment 
to those convicted in the few jurisdictions, which, 
like California, provide for the expungement of a rec-
ord of conviction upon the termination of proba-
tion.107 
After more than a century of evolution, most express reliance on 
state remedial measures has disappeared, and the norm of federal 
uniformity has clearly ascended. However, the legislative history of 
the 1996 federalization of the definition of conviction sheds virtually 
no light on whether congress even considered—let alone can be said 
to have had an opinion about—the viability of post-conviction state 
actions.108 A brief historical look at some of these measures demon-
strates why it may be impossible to completely achieve uniformity, 
even if Congress were to try. 
                                                                                                             
P–, 9 I. & N. Dec. 293, 295 (A.G. 1961) (conviction set aside pursuant to writ of 
coram nobis for a constitutional defect could not serve as basis for order of depor-
tation). 
 105 A—F—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 446 (B.I.A. 1960). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 As the Attorney General recounted in Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 710, 
the main focus of the 1996 legislative change was to standardize rules for deter-
mining whether a state court’s decision to withhold an adjudication of guilt prior 
to the entry of a formal judgment of conviction would count for immigration pur-
poses. See HYDE, JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828 at 199, 223 (1996) [hereinafter Conf. 
Rep.]. 
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A.   The JRAD 
The history of the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation 
(JRAD) offers a fascinating example of state/federal overlap.109 Es-
sentially, the JRAD allowed a state court sentencing judge to rule 
definitively against deportation, thereby trumping federal supremacy 
and preemption in practice.110 For nearly a century, this was seen as 
legitimate, if not essential, for many reasons including efficiency, 
fairness, and federal deference to state power.111  
The JRAD was first crafted in 1917 as part of a rather compre-
hensive reorganization of United States immigration law.112 Much 
of that reorganization involved the creation of bridges and relation-
ships between state criminal laws and deportation.113 These connec-
tions derived more from public perceptions than from strong empir-
ical data about immigrant criminality.114 Indeed, the highly influen-
tial Dillingham Commission began its 1911 report on immigration 
and crime by noting that “[n]o satisfactory evidence has yet been 
produced to show that immigration has resulted in an increase in 
crime disproportionate to the increase in adult population.”115 Still, 
the Commission suggested that immigration had wrought certain 
changes in “the character of crime.”116 The report opined that there 
had been increases in certain types of violent crimes, certain “of-
fenses against public policy” (i.e., “disorderly conduct, drunken-
ness, vagrancy” and “many offenses incident to city life”) and, the 
                                                                                                             
 109 Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90 
[hereinafter 1917 Immigration Act]; see also Immigration & Nationality Act of 
1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988), repealed by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. 101-649, § 602(b), 104 Stat. 4978. 
 110 See 1917 Immigration Act § 19; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation 
is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1330–31 (2011). 
 111 See Markowitz, supra note 110, at 1330–31. 
 112 See 1917 Immigration Act § 19. 
 113 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing that “[t]he current deportation system[‘s 
growth was] . . . . closely linked to the development of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) . . . . Those who today face deportation for minor crimes 
would likely be surprised to learn that they bear the burden of decades of govern-
ment frustration over [] well-known criminals”). 
 114 See id. 
 115 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION COMM’N: 
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. DOC. NO. 61-750, at 1 (3d Sess. 1911). 
 116 Id. at 2. 
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rather charmingly named, “offenses against chastity.”117 Indeed, the 
Commission specifically noted that Native American born offenders 
“exhibited in general a tendency to commit more serious crimes than 
did the immigrant.”118 Nevertheless, the Commission saw it as a “se-
rious” and “inexcusable[] defect . . . that aliens admitted to this coun-
try . . . may pursue a criminal career without danger of deporta-
tion.”119 Thus, the Commission recommended that “provision 
should be made for ridding the United States of aliens who, within 
a relatively short time after arrival, become criminals.”120 The outer 
recommended limit was the period of naturalization, lasting typi-
cally five years.121  
The Immigration Act of 1917 contained a provision that pro-
vided for the deportation of various noncitizens who were convicted 
of certain types of crimes (particularly crimes “involving moral tur-
pitude” and prostitution-related offenses) after their admission to the 
United States.122 State convictions were absolutely central to this 
model. The bitter aspects of state criminal processes were, so to 
speak, ameliorated by the sweet. The 1917 law thus created the 
JRAD and further stated that the deportation of “aliens” convicted of 
a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has 
been pardoned.123 Thus, when the system of federal removal was first 
                                                                                                             
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 167. 
 119 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION COMM’N: 
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. DOC. NO. 61-747, at 34 (3d Sess. 1911). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id.; see Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, 30 VA. 
J.L. & POL. 465 (2015) (suggesting a return to such a five year statute of limita-
tions) 
 122 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 28, §§ 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90 (1917). 
 123 Id. The later, codified version, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988), repealed by Im-
migration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 602(b), 104 Stat. 4978, reads as fol-
lows: 
The provisions of subsection (a)(4) of this section [the 
moral turpitude ground] respecting the deportation of an 
alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply . . . 
(2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall 
make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing 
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created, states were empowered not only to create federal deporta-
tions but to avoid them as well. 
There was a deep logic to this that is worth recalling. The history 
of the JRAD shows considerable recognition that the state court sen-
tencing judge was in the best position to determine whether the sanc-
tion of deportation should be added to the criminal sanctions.124
 
When JRADs were invoked, they could be powerful discretionary 
modes of relief from deportation. JRADs, for moral turpitude con-
victions, bound the (former) INS.125 Though INS retained authority 
to deport on other grounds, many types of offenses were deemed 
crimes of moral turpitude so the potential reach of a JRAD was sig-
nificant.126 Moreover, it is apparent that state court judges (and pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys) were acutely aware of the deportation 
sanction. This leads not only to concern about it, but to ever-chang-
ing attempts to become involved with it. However, as Margaret Tay-
                                                                                                             
sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommenda-
tion to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, 
due notice having been given prior to making such recom-
mendation to representatives of the interested State, the 
Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted 
an opportunity to make representations in the matter. The 
provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the case of 
any alien who is charged with being deportable from the 
United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section. 
 124 Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immi-
gration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1144 (2002) (citing 53 CONG. REC. 5171 
(1916) (statement of Rep. Powers) (“[A]t the time the judgment is rendered and 
at the time the sentence is passed, the judge is best qualified to make these recom-
mendations.”)). 
 125 Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452–53 (2d Cir. 1986) (JRAD “has 
consistently been interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority 
to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for de-
portation.”). Accord Velez-Lozano v. I.N.S., 463 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. 
Santarelli v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613, 616–17 (3d Cir. 1940). 
 126 See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (“In the construction of 
the specific section of the Statute before us, a court of appeals has stated that fraud 
has ordinarily been the test to determine whether crimes not of the gravest char-
acter involve moral turpitude.”). However, convictions for narcotics offenses 
were removed from the scope of the JRAD in 1956. Jew Ten v. I.N.S., 307 F.2d 
832, 834 (9th Cir. 1962). 
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lor and Ronald Wright have noted, the original congressional link-
age between deportation and sentencing remained an unfinished 
project.127 A main reason for this was the venerable doctrine that 
deportation has long been formalistically viewed as a civil sanction, 
not criminal punishment.128 Also, in practice, the possibility of a 
JRAD did not always come to the attention of sentencing judges.129 
Still, the very idea of the JRAD put considerable pressure on the 
doctrine that deportation was merely a civil, collateral consequence 
of state criminal convictions. Indeed, some non-citizens claimed in-
effective assistance of counsel because their attorneys had misad-
vised them about the JRAD option.130 Courts are divided on whether 
this could warrant reopening a guilty plea.131 The JRAD also em-
powered state judges, who, in turn, could apply state and even local 
norms to the federal deportation system.132 As the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals noted in its 1986 decision in Janvier v. United 
States,133 the JRAD was seen by some courts as “part of the sentenc-
ing process, a critical stage of the prosecution to which the Sixth 
Amendment safeguards are applicable.”134
 
Indeed, the Janvier court 
saw deportation as inextricably linked to the underlying crime and 
therefore, subject to the sentencing discretion of the state court judge 
“who best knew the facts” and who may have thought that “the dras-
tic penalty of deportation was unwarranted.”135 The JRAD remained 
                                                                                                             
 127 Taylor, supra note 124, at 1148. 
 128 See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 15–20 (discussing the lack of constitutional protec-
tions afforded persons facing deportation). 
 129 See Taylor & Wright, supra note 124, at 1148. 
 130 See Janvier, 793 F.2d at 451. 
 131 See, e.g., Retamoza v. State, 874 P.2d 603, 607 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (sur-
veying precedents). 
 132 See Janvier, 793 F.2d at 453 (concluding that JRADs were “designed to 
make the total penalty for the crime less harsh and less severe when deportation 
would appear to be unjust”). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Taylor & Wright, supra note 124, at 1146 (citing Janvier v. United States, 
793 F.2d 449, 452–53 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 135 Id. 
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part of immigration law until its repeal in 1990.136 A House commit-
tee offered a strong volte-face from the 1917 model: 
Because the Committee is convinced that it is im-
proper to allow a court that has never passed on the 
immigration related issues involved in an alien’s case 
to pass binding judgment on whether the alien should 
be deported, section 1504 states that judicial recom-
mendations will no longer protect aliens from depor-
tation . . . .137 
This assertion of a technocratic norm (with implicit nods to strong 
federal preemption) thus dovetailed with a substantial hardening of 
deportation laws in this era, which reached its apotheosis in 1996.138 
The elimination of the JRAD did not initially spawn much piv-
otal judicial reaction. The repeal inspired some constitutional chal-
lenges.139 The statute said that repeal took effect immediately and 
applied “to convictions entered before, on, or after” the date of en-
actment.140
 
Some contended that this violated the ex post facto 
clause.141 Courts, however, generally rejected such claims.142 
                                                                                                             
 136 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, §§ 505(b), 602(b), 104 Stat. 
4978, 5050. The INS interpreted this language to render ineffective only those 
JRADs entered after November 29, 1990, when Congress enacted the JRAD re-
peal; any JRAD entered before that date “continues to be valid and continues to 
have the effect of precluding the use of the conviction to establish deportability.” 
Elimination of Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation, 56 Fed. Reg. 
8906 (Mar. 4, 1991) (implementing the JRAD repeal). 
 137 H.R. REP. NO. 101-681, pt. 1, at 149 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6555. 
 138 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010). 
 139 See, e.g., Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 831, 834–35 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing the fact that a JRAD motion 
was issued concurrently with the criminal sentence “does nothing to alter the pre-
cept that deportation is not punishment.”); People v. Cuello, 591 N.Y.S.2d 409, 
428 (App. Div. 1992); see also United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 
1994) (treating an appeal of an injunction to enforce a JRAD order as civil, be-
cause “[t]he mere fact that the JRAD is part of the sentencing process does not 
convert it or proceedings enforcing it into criminal proceedings”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 140 Immigration Act of 1990 § 505(b). 
 141 See cases cited supra note 139. 
 142 See cases cited supra note 139. 
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More recently, though, the elimination of the JRAD loomed no-
tably large in the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky.143 As Justice Stevens’ opinion recounted, the removal of 
the JRAD, together with certain harsh changes enacted by Congress 
in 1996, had rendered removal “practically inevitable” if a nonciti-
zen “has committed a removable offense.”144 These changes to im-
migration law “dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s crim-
inal conviction,” thus, highlighting the importance of “accurate le-
gal advice” regarding deportation consequences in state court crim-
inal proceedings.145 
In addition to its powerful implications for our understanding of 
the juridical nature of deportation itself (i.e., as punishment or not), 
Padilla illuminates the inherent tension discussed above between 
state and federal actors. Like the JRAD of old, Padilla’s norms 
straddle goals of federal supremacy and uniformity and state auton-
omy. This becomes especially interesting when such norms derive 
from state constitutions or declarations of rights. Indeed, even the 
BIA—in its major opinion interpreting federal uniformity in the 
meaning of a conviction—deferred to some state determinations in-
cluding: “where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a 
state court on direct appeal, wherein the court determines that vaca-
tion of the conviction is warranted on the merits, or on grounds re-
lating to a violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional 
right in the underlying criminal proceedings.”146 The Attorney Gen-
eral later reiterated this interpretation, concluding that the federal 
                                                                                                             
 143 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363–64. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 364. 
 146 Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 523 (B.I.A. 1999) (emphasis added). 
The Board did not reach the issue of the effect of “noncollateral challenges to a 
conviction on these grounds that are pending in state court while an alien is in 
deportation proceedings.” Id. See also Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A. 
2003) (evaluating the actions of a Canadian court which had quashed a conviction 
for LSD possession without specifying why it had done so). The BIA in Pickering 
concluded that if the court had quashed the conviction solely for rehabilitative pur-
poses or to avoid immigration hardships, it would not be recognized. Id. at 624. 
However, had the court redressed a “procedural or substantive defect in the under-
lying proceedings,” then the conviction would not be meaningful for immigration 
purposes. Id. But see L—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (B.I.A. 1954) (stating that a 
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definition of “conviction” “encompasses judgments of conviction 
that . . . have been entered but then vacated or set aside [pursuant to 
an expungement statute] for reasons that do not go to the legal pro-
priety of the original judgment and that continue to impose some 
restraints or penalties upon the defendant’s liberty.”147 
This approach has largely stood the test of time.148 The essential 
rule now is that state post-conviction relief that is granted, so to 
speak, “on the merits,” will effectively bind federal authorities and 
will prevent deportation.149 If, however, a state court acts pursuant 
to a rehabilitative statute or a state expungement mechanism, its ac-
tion is likely to be ignored by federal immigration authorities.150  
The most basic reason for this distinction was offered by the At-
torney General in Matter of Marroquin: state laws that authorize the 
subsequent expungement of a conviction “typically do so for rea-
sons that are entirely unrelated to the legal propriety of the underly-
ing judgment of conviction.”151 These reasons, in other words, do 
not relate to “the factual basis for, or the procedural validity of, the 
conviction.”152 When considering specific state statutes abstractly 
this rule seems passably clear. But in practice, there has been much 
variation. It turns out to be no simple matter to determine whether 
state action is ameliorative.153 Case law varies substantively and pro-
cedurally, including who has the burden on the critical question.154 
                                                                                                             
gubernatorial pardon is not rendered conditional due to the words “to prevent de-
portation.”). 
 147 Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705, 715 (A.G. 2005). 
 148 Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 23 (2d. Cir. 2007); Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 
F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2005); Parikh v. Gonzales, 155 Fed. App’x 635, 638 (4th 
Cir. 2005); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 149 Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 715. 
 150 See Moore, supra note 41, at 668; Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 715. 
 151 Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 713. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 85–94 (4th ed. 
2009). 
 154 See id. at 88–89. 
2016] IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND STATE POST-CONVICTION 
ADJUDICATIONS 521 
 
One cannot cite this body of case law as a stellar example of uni-
formity.155 Also, when we deal with state judicial determinations un-
der such standards as “the interest of justice” the doctrinal picture 
starts to look particularly murky.156 
For state judges, consideration of federal goals and possible 
preemption may affect, limit, impede, or even (in rare cases) expand 
the protection of rights in certain state constitutional adjudica-
tions.157 This prompts variants of the questions posed in this article’s 
introduction. Should state judges consider federal goals at all in 
these sorts of cases? If so, how, and how much? For federal judges, 
conversely, awareness of the venerable and inevitable nature of this 
porosity should refine analyses of federal supremacy and preemp-
tion in immigration enforcement law. But how? In both cases, the 
legislative trends are clear. The realm of “post-conviction relief” 
from removal has moved from “a presumption of full faith and credit 
with a few limited exceptions such as narcotics” to a rule that is vir-
tually limited to state adjudications based on an “underlying defect 
in the criminal conviction.”158 And yet, uniformity and supremacy 
remain elusive.159 
 
B.   Padilla v. Kentucky and its Federal and State Progeny 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
norms of Strickland v. Washington160 applied to noncitizen Jose Pa-
dilla’s claim that his criminal defense counsel was ineffective due 
to allegedly incorrect advice concerning the risk of deportation.161 
                                                                                                             
 155 See id. at 85–94. 
 156 See, e.g., People v. McLernon, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually disagreed with and 
overruled the BIA’s evaluation of the Canadian court’s motives in Pickering it-
self. See Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2006) (vacating the 
BIA’s decision and reversing and remanding “to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals for entry of an order terminating deportation proceedings and quashing the 
order of deportation”). 
 157 See e.g., United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 344–46 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 158 See Moore, supra note 41, at 686. 
 159 Id.; Cade, supra note 40, at 381–83. 
 160 466 U.S. 668, 689–94 (1984). 
 161 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 374 (2010). 
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Contrary to the Kentucky Supreme Court (and others), such advice 
was not “categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel” even though deportation is still nominally a 
civil sanction.162 As I have previously recounted, there is a lot pack-
aged within this line of reasoning, especially as to the constitutional 
understanding of deportation. “Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
cannot fully be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of 
deportation to the realm of civil collateral consequences . . . .”163 
Indeed, Justice Stevens spoke at the conference for which this article 
was written. I had the opportunity to ask him whether he thought we 
had reached a point where at least some forms of deportation should 
be considered “punishment” for constitutional purposes. His re-
freshingly simple and candid answer: “Yes.” 
Though the Padilla opinion was groundbreaking in many re-
spects, its recognition of a duty of criminal defense counsel to advise 
about deportation was not a new idea for many states.164 A general 
right to effective assistance of counsel has long been mandated by 
some state constitutions.165 Moreover, state courts have repeatedly 
recognized that application of the standards announced in Strickland 
inevitably involved nuanced applications of state norms.166 This had 
                                                                                                             
 162 Id. at 366. 
 163 Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The 
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 95, at 
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 165 See, e.g., People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987) (citing CAL. CONST., art. I, § 15, granting petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
and remanding the case to the trial court to allow noncitizen defendant to with-
draw his guilty plea because he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel). 
 166 See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526–27 (Colo. 1987). 
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sometimes, pre-Padilla, included a specific right to advice about im-
migration consequences, though courts were generally tentative to 
go quite that far.167 In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted 
in People v. Pozo that the justices were not “prepared to state in ab-
solute terms,” that an attorney had a duty “to advise an alien client 
of the possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea.”168 How-
ever, the application of “an objective standard of reasonable con-
duct” led them to conclude that the lower court’s “underlying con-
cern over counsel’s failure to engage in rudimentary legal investiga-
tion [was] compelling.”169 This duty, said the Colorado court, did 
not stem from a duty to advise specifically about deportation conse-
quences, but rather “from the more fundamental principle that attor-
neys must inform themselves of material legal principles that may 
significantly impact the particular circumstances of their clients.”170 
The important point for our purposes is that there was long deci-
sional history about related issues in states pre-Padilla. Justice Ste-
vens’s majority opinion referred to this history many times, as did 
innumerable amici.171 
However, one of the dissenters in Pozo, Justice Rovira, high-
lighted two major recurring problems: finality and complexity.172 
Both of these issues seem to support state court deference to federal 
enforcement priorities. They might also, if too simplistically under-
stood, lead to unwise federal court preemption decisions. Justice 
Rovira recounted United States v. Timmreck,173 a 1979 Supreme 
Court case in which a criminal defendant had “sought habeas corpus 
relief and alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because he 
was unaware of the mandatory parole term that would result from 
his conviction. The Supreme Court unanimously held that no relief 
should be granted,174 concluding with a concern that ironically relied 
                                                                                                             
 167 See id. at 526–28. 
 168 Id. at 527. 
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 171 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010). 
 172 See Pozo, 746 P.2d at 533 (Rovira, J., dissenting). 
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in part upon a 1971 dissent by Justice Stevens,175 destined, some 40 
years later, to be the author of Padilla: 
Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines 
confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by 
increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably 
delays and impairs the orderly administration of jus-
tice.176 
Clearly, one way to read Padilla is as a rejection of this concern as 
a general matter in favor of a more robust regime of rights protection 
to be jointly (dialogically) implemented by state and federal courts.  
The same is true for the problem of complexity, which was 
strongly considered by Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Rob-
erts) in Padilla.177 They accepted a duty not to “unreasonably” pro-
vide incorrect advice.178 However, beyond that, they saw only a duty 
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of the sentence which the judge may impose, and the chance of probation or pa-
role. An erroneous appraisal of any of those factors affects the wisdom of the plea, 
but does not make it involuntary.” Id. at 530. Justice Stevens also noted that “[t]he 
most effective safeguard against manifest injustice is competent counsel.” Id. at 
535. 
 177 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375–88 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 178 Id. 
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to “advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse 
immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this 
issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney.”179 Because 
of the complexity of immigration law, they did not agree “that the 
attorney must attempt to explain what those consequences may 
be.”180 “Incomplete legal advice [by criminal defense lawyers who 
are not experts in immigration law]” they wrote, “may be worse than 
no advice at all because it may mislead and may dissuade the client 
from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source.”181 This is 
a legitimate concern, to be sure. But, it supports a right to deporta-
tion counsel, not a depreciated duty standard for the only lawyer 
who may actually be available.182 
As state courts began to apply and interpret Padilla’s norms, it 
is unsurprising that their readings varied. The particularly hard ques-
tion was that of retroactivity. Here, per Teague v. Lane,183 courts 
must consider whether the Court’s criminal procedure decisions are 
“novel.”184 When the Court announces a “new rule,” a person whose 
conviction is already final may not benefit from the decision in a 
habeas or similar proceeding.185 Under Teague’s model, “a case an-
nounces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new 
obligation” on the government.186 In another formulation, “a case 
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent ex-
isting at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”187 A 
holding is not so dictated, the Court later clarified, unless it would 
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 182 Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The 
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 184 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (“Teague makes 
the retroactivity of our criminal procedure decisions turn on whether they are 
novel.”). 
 185 Id. Teague contained two exceptions: “watershed” rules and rules placing 
“conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. 
 186 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
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have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”188 Teague also made 
clear that a case does not “announce a new rule, [when] it ‘[is] 
merely an application of the principle that governed’” a prior deci-
sion to a different set of facts.189 Clearly, the application of Teague 
to Padilla was not going to be a simple task, owing to the complexity 
of the constitutional status of deportation.  
The Court undertook this task in Chaidez v. United States, and 
concluded that “Padilla would not have created a new rule had it 
only applied Strickland’s general standard to yet another factual sit-
uation—that is, had Padilla merely made clear that a lawyer who 
neglects to inform a client about the risk of deportation is profes-
sionally incompetent.”190 “But Padilla,” wrote Justice Kagan, “did 
something more.”191 The case, as noted above, “considered a thresh-
old question: Was advice about deportation ‘categorically removed’ 
from the scope of the Sixth Amendment as a ‘collateral conse-
quence’ . . . ?”192 On this view, the Padilla Court had answered “a 
question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach that we had left open, 
in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions.”193 However one 
views Chaidez, its retroactivity reasoning only binds federal courts. 
As noted above, this is due to “considerations of comity,” recog-
nized by Danforth v. Minnesota.194 States may “give broader effect 
than federal courts do to new rules of criminal procedure.”195 But 
how should they do so? How much should uniformity count in the 
calculus when immigration federal enforcement is affected by a 
state court retroactivity ruling? 
Some state courts had answered the basic question before 
Chaidez. The Maryland Supreme Court, for example, concluded that 
“Padilla did not ‘overrule[] prior law and declare[] a new principle 
                                                                                                             
 188 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997). 
 189 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216–17 
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 194 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279–80 (2008) (discussing that 
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of law.’”196 “Rather, Padilla applied ‘settled precedent [i.e., Strick-
land] to [a] new and different factual situation[],’ and, therefore, that 
decision ‘applies retroactively.’”197 Since Chaidez, the calculus for 
some state courts has changed. Some courts, highlighting uniformity 
and finality, have simply deferred to the federal system.198 For ex-
ample, in Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court expressly rejected petitioners’ argument that “the 
state’s interest in fairness and due process protections weighs more 
heavily than uniformity with the federal standard.”199 Rather, the 
Court offered an extended argument that Padilla was a “new rule” 
and that Chaidez, therefore, was correctly decided.200 The Connect-
icut Court also noted that “the state’s interest in fairness and due 
process protections must be balanced against the importance of the 
finality of convictions.”201 The Court specifically agreed with the 
Supreme Court’s observation in Teague that “[w]ithout finality, the 
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”202 
Other state court decisions defer much less to the federal system, 
both as to the application of Teague as understood in Chaidez and 
as to federal enforcement uniformity goals more generally. For ex-
ample, in Commonwealth v. Sylvain, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court (SJC) highlighted the “general principle that States are 
independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce 
                                                                                                             
 196 Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 925 (Md. 2011) (quoting State v. 
Daughtry, 18 A.3d 60, 78 (Md. 2011)). 
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their own laws as long as they do not infringe on the [F]ederal con-
stitutional guarantees.”203 Thus, “considerations of comity militate 
in favor of allowing [S]tate courts to grant [collateral] relief to a 
broader class of individuals than is required by Teague.”204 The SJC 
thus saw “an important distinction between the existence of a Fed-
eral substantive right or remedy, the contours of which are fixed by 
Federal law, and the procedural availability of such a right, the scope 
of which may be set by State law.”205 Based on this authority to con-
duct an independent review, the SJC did not see itself as required 
“to blindly follow that court’s view of what constitutes a new 
rule.”206 As the Maryland Supreme Court had boldly asserted, 
“[e]ven if the Supreme Court ever were to hold that Padilla is not 
retroactive under Teague, that holding would have no adverse effect 
on our analysis here.”207 This seems exactly right as a model for 
proactive dialogical federalism. The state court, operating in a 
rights-protecting mode, is applying its own norms. It does this with 
awareness of—but without excessive deference to—federal models 
of retroactivity or concerns about uniformity. 
Similar examples of state court autonomy arise around the prob-
lem of proving “prejudice.”208 Padilla, as noted, applied the two-
part test of Strickland.209 This demands proof, first, that trial coun-
sel’s performance failed to meet “prevailing professional norms” 
and, second, that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the 
defendant.210 This latter prong, according to some courts, requires 
state courts to assess whether a defendant “might rationally be more 
concerned with removal than with a term of imprisonment.”211 Note 
                                                                                                             
 203 Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Mass. 2013) (citing 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008)). 
 204 Id. (citing Danforth, 552 U.S. at 279–80). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. (citing Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61 (Idaho 2010), cert. denied 131 S. 
Ct. 1571 (2011)). 
 207 Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 924–25 n.8 (Md. 2011). 
 208 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). 
 209 Id. at 366. 
 210 Id. at 366–69. 
 211 See Zemene v. Clarke, 768 S.E.2d 684, 691–92 (Va. 2015) (explaining that 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is violated by failure 
to advise about the possible immigration consequences of a conviction) (quoting 
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011)); see also People v. 
2016] IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND STATE POST-CONVICTION 
ADJUDICATIONS 529 
 
the important implication here: Such an inquiry clearly demands 
some understanding and application of immigration law, both ab-
stractly and as likely to be applied by federal authorities. A New 
York appellate court concluded, for example, that “the strength of 
the People’s evidence, the potential sentence, and the effect of prior 
convictions” must be weighed against a variety of immigration law 
factors, including, for example, whether, “an alien has significant 
ties to his or her country of origin, or has only resided in the United 
States for a relatively brief period of time, or has no family here.”212 
In such cases, “a decision to proceed to trial in lieu of a favorable 
plea agreement may be irrational in the face of overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt and a potentially lengthy prison sentence.”213 How-
ever, for a long-term lawful permanent resident, the calculus might 
well be different.214 
Conversely, some state courts focus almost exclusively on the 
sentence, rather than on the removal.215 Even those courts that ap-
plied the prejudice prong this strictly, however, cannot avoid at least 
some inquiry into immigration law, per the logic of Padilla.216 
The most impressive state court decisions navigate between state 
norms and respectful awareness of federal enforcement realities. In 
Commonwealth v. Marinho, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
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Court considered the duties of defense counsel, post-Padilla.217 The 
majority opinion is fascinating in that it takes account of the federal 
system. But it does so with little deference to federal enforcement 
goals of uniformity or finality. Put another way, the SJC offers what 
amounts to a Massachusetts take on immigration enforcement 
through a very broad reading of Padilla. As the SJC put it, 
Underlying the Supreme Court’s decision that depor-
tation consequences are not “collateral” to the crimi-
nal justice process and thus not removed from a 
noncitizens’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a 
deep appreciation of the “seriousness of deportation” 
for noncitizen defendants. Indeed, “[p]reserving the 
client’s right to remain in the United States may be 
more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence.”218 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS NUANCED PREEMPTION AND TRUE 
DIALOGICAL IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 
 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are 
to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indef-
inite. 
James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, in THE FEDERALIST 308, 
313 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 
The baroque relationship between federal immigration enforce-
ment and state criminal law demands hard thinking about both 
preemption and federalism.219 The best doctrinal models should fa-
cilitate cooperation and “tolerate tension.”220 The latter is especially 
important in the realm of claims regarding rights. A fruitful starting 
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point is what Heather Gerken has termed “the power of the serv-
ant.”221 States exercise power in cooperative regimes, as federal 
“servants,” not as separate sovereigns.222 As administrators of the 
federal regime, states often have a great deal of discretion in carry-
ing out federal policies in “the nooks and crannies of the adminis-
trative system.”223 Power of this type looks more like that 
“wield[ed] . . . [by] . . . a street-level bureaucrat” than that exercised 
by a separate and autonomous government.224 Thus, state power de-
pends on “integration and interdependence.”225 This model accounts 
for much real-world state power in immigration enforcement. How-
ever, viewing state courts applying state criminal and state constitu-
tional norms as merely servants in “a complex amalgam of state and 
local actors who administer national policy” undervalues both state 
normativity and state historical authority.226 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has adopted substan-
tial aspects of the Padilla opinion and made them central to its own 
state constitutional analysis. While one may (as I do) applaud this 
approach, it requires some defense. The best defense is this: It is 
clear from Arizona v. United States that State action related to im-
migration enforcement may neither expressly conflict with federal 
enforcement priorities nor may it contravene fundamental constitu-
tional rights. This is why the Court only tentatively upheld Arizona’s 
SB 1070, Section 2(B).227 Constitutional conformity requires state 
enforcement agents and state courts to be deeply engaged in immi-
gration-related processes. But they often must do so in the context of 
historically powerful sub-federal systems, such as criminal law en-
forcement, retroactivity analysis, etc. Thus, the best state court deci-
sions balance autonomy, fidelity to state precedent, and protections 
of rights with awareness of federal concerns. There is no precise for-
mula, but nuanced state court adjudications should help federal 
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courts, when considering preemption challenges to state actions, to 
resist formalistic (and unrealistic) field preemption or plenary power 
preemption. Moreover, the benefits of this approach could be sub-
stantial. With equal protection as a backstop, it could empower the 
states to “define the boundaries of their own political communities” 
thereby offering a truly transformative model of the new immigration 
federalism.228 
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